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Willie Thompson has acknowledged in his survey of the history of the world- 
wide left, The Left in History: Revolution and Reform in Twentieth-Century 
Politics, that the Trotskyists "occasionally achieved some marginal industrial 
influence" in the US trade unions.' However, outside of the Trotskyists' role in 
the Teamsters Union in Minneapolis and unlike the role of the Communist Party 
(CP) in the US labor movement that has been well-documented in numerous 
books and articles, little of a systematic nature has been written about Trotskyist 
activity in the US trade union movement.' This article's goal is to begin to 
bridge a gap in the historical record left by other historians of labor and radical 
movements, by examining the role of the two wings of US Trotskyism, repre- 
sented by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Workers Party (WP), in 
the United Auto Workers (UAW) from 1939 to 1949. 
In spite of these two groups' relatively small numbers within the auto 
workers' union and although neither the SWP nor the WP was particularly suc- 
cessful in recruiting auto workers to their organizations, the Trotskyists played 
an active role in the UAW as leading individuals and activists, and as an organ- 
ized left presence in opposition to the larger and more powerful CP. In addi- 
tion, these Trotskyists were able to exert an influence that was significant at 
times, beyond their small membership with respect to vital issues confronting 
the UAW. At various times throughout the 1940s, for example, these trade 
unionists were skillful in mobilizing auto unionists in opposition to both the no- 
strike pledge during World War 11, and the Taft-Hartley bill in the postwar peri- 
od. They also organized UAW members in fighting for the inclusion of the esca- 
lator clause in 1947-1948 while constructing a non-CP left-wing presence with- 
in the union. This activity was based largely on how these two organizations 
came to conceive of left-wing politics in the post-World War I1 era, both with- 
in the UAW and the nation as a whole. 
Since the SWP and the WP each viewed itself as the vanguard party that 
would lead the US working class in revolution, both parties were in favor of 
organizing an independent left-wing opposition to the UAW bureaucracy dur- 
ing World War I1 in order to keep a revolutionary political program alive with- 
in the union. However, by the late 1940s, while the SWP clung to this position, 
the WP abandoned its goal of establishing such a movement, eventually com- 
ing to see the Reuther Caucus - the dominant political faction within the UAW 
after 1947 upon the election of Walter Reuther to the union presidency for the 
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second time - as the embodiment of a left-wing, militant, and democratic 
UAW. The paper will conclude with a comparison between the program of the 
CP circa 1939 to 1949 to that of the SWP and the WP within the auto union dur- 
ing the same era. This will provide a context to understand and critique the two 
Trotskyist groups' participation within the UAW and their attempt to promote a 
revolutionary politics during this tumultuous decade. 
The Prewar and the World War I1 Era 
On the eve of World War 11, the UAW had situated itself to play an important 
role in the political economy of the United States. At this time, the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CIO) had resumed its upward trajectory and in the 
forefront of the young industrial federation was the UAW. The auto union dou- 
bled its membership in 194 1 and by December 1942 had enrolled more than one 
million members and had become, according to Nelson Lichtenstein, "the 
largest independent organization of workers in the world."' 
With the UAW organizing the defense plants where uninterrupted produc- 
tion was crucial to the success of the war effort, the auto union was in a unique 
position to expand its influence among the New Deal policy makers in the 
nation's capital. Since the warfare state required industrial cooperation from 
the UAW and its members, the union and its leaders played a pivotal role in 
forging "a new political-administrative framework for wartime industrial rela- 
tions" while simultaneously increasing the influence of the labor-liberal 
alliance throughout the count~y.~ Thus, events and issues which confronted the 
auto workers' union during World War 11, such as the "equality of sacrifice" 
program resulting in the conceding of premium pay, the wave of wildcat strikes 
in 1943 and 1944, and the debates over incentive pay and the no-strike pledge, 
reverberated far beyond the hallways of power in Washington DC. 
Prior to its emergence as the vanguard of the industrial union movement, 
by the middle of 1940, the UAW-C10 had grown to approximately 250 000 
members within three years, and had already undergone a significant amount of 
factional struggle. Throughout 1938, Homer Martin, then UAW president, had 
steadily lost the support of large segments of the union's membership. By early 
1939, Martin had broken with the C10 and was making plans to affiliate his 
"rump" union with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Two separate 
UAW conventions were organized in 1939: the C10 supporters convened one 
in Cleveland, while Martin held his in Detroit. In response to this internal tur- 
moil within the auto workers' union, General Motors and Chrysler stated that 
collective bargaining would be suspended at plants where two competing ' 
unions existed.' 
Because of their opposition to the CP, the leaders of the Trotskyists had ini- 
tially aligned with Martin and his Progressive Caucus, arguing that Martin and 
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his supporters were more left wing than the Unity Caucus, which included com- 
munists and socialists. However, the auto cadre in the party did not agree with 
this characterization, arguing that the rank-and-file activists within the Unity 
Caucus were "much more progressive" than Martin's followers. When the split 
in the UAW came in 1939, the Trotskyists opposed Martin and participated in 
the UAW-C10 convention in Cleveland where 90 000 workers were represent- 
ed as opposed to the 17 000 workers allegedly allied with Martin at the UAW- 
AFL convention in DetroiL6 
The Trotskyists broke with Martin because they believed his organizing of 
an "anti-C10 convention," which he announced on 21 January 1939, was a bla- 
tant attempt to form a "reactionary alliance with the AF of L Executive 
Council," in order to make "deals with the automobile manufacturers." In the 
14 February 1939 issue of the SWP's Socialist Appeal, the Trotskyists outlined 
a "Union Building" program and called for the formation of an independent 
progressive group within the UAW. Their position was that the UAW was in a 
"disastrous state" because of the current leadership of the union, consisting "of 
a combination of Lewis men and Stalinist supporters" and that contributions by 
"Martin and his crowd" had led to "an unbroken record of incompetence, lazi- 
ness and reactionary politics" within the UAW.' 
Dubbed the "auto crisis" within the Party, the initial Trotskyist support for 
Martin emerged while James Cannon, the SWP National Secretary from 1938 
to 1953, was out of the country after the Fourth International's founding con- 
ference in the fall of 1938. With Max Shachtrnan and James Burnham, the 
other two members of the Party's secretariat in 1938, directing the SWP 
Political Committee in Cannon's absence, these two leaders' fear of the CP 
dominating the Unity Caucus resulted in their forcing the auto fraction to accept 
the disastrous policy of backing Martin. When the vast majority of the auto 
union abandoned Martin, the Party embarked on a sudden and awkward rever- 
sal requiring two issues of the Socialist Appeal, one first supporting Martin and 
a second withdrawing Party backing, without Shachtman and Burnham accept- 
ing responsibility for the debacle within the auto fra~t ion.~ 
Although the late 1930s were tumultuous ones for the UAW, the years of 
1939 and 1940 were equally as turbulent for US Trotskyists who were heading 
into an organizational split just as they were beginning to obtain a modicum of 
influence in three primary areas of the US trade union movement: the Teamsters 
union in Minneapolis, the maritime unions, and the nascent UAW. For exam- 
ple, the Trotskyists' Union Building program for the UAW in 1939 was official- 
ly adopted by five small UAW locals, largely due to the significant influence 
wielded by two Trotskyists active in the UAW, Bert Cochran in three Cleveland 
locals and John Anderson in two Detroit locals. Bert Cochran was involved in 
the Cleveland locals of Willard Storage Battery Local 88, Weatherhead Local 
463, and Baker Raulang Local 45 1, while John Anderson was active in McCord 
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Radiator Local 210 and Fleetwood Local 15. The Trotskyists also made con- 
tacts or established "sympathetic groups" in five additional locals: Dodge Local 
3 (Detroit), Hudson Local 154 (Detroit), Dill Local 263 (Cleveland), Chevrolet 
Local 156 (Flint), and Chevrolet Local 467 (Sag ina~) .~  
At a union conference attended by delegates of the ten local unions men- 
tioned above, held on 4 March 1939 in Detroit, the Trotskyists' Union Building 
program was adopted, as well as a resolution calling for the formation of a 
Labor Party in the United States. In addition, a steering committee was elect- 
ed to guide the work of this independent third group at the upcoming UAW-C10 
convention. At this gathering, the Trotskyists' caucus was comprised of fifteen 
delegates who presented their Union Building program, a dramatic increase 
from the two delegates they had at the union's previous convention. With many 
sections of their program adopted at this meeting, the Trotskyists had made 
their presence felt within the union.'' 
Shachtrnan and Burnham's Stalinophobia - that is the losing of one's 
political bearings because of the belief that the crimes of Stalinism overwhelm 
everything else -that was revealed in the "auto crisis" during the latter months 
of 1938 and the early part of 1939, reached fruition in the spring of 1940 when 
their faction refused to unconditionally defend the Soviet Union arguing that it 
was no longer a workers' state. Beginning in mid-1939 until the SWP special 
convention in April 1940, the nature of the political and economic system in the 
Soviet Union, or "the Russian Question," had taken precedence as the major 
issue of debate among US Trotskyists. When the split had occurred, the SWP, 
led by Cannon, remained the "orthodox Trotskyist" organization, maintaining 
that the Soviet Union was a bureaucratically "degenerated workers state" still 
worthy of unconditional defense from imperialist aggression. The "unorthodox 
Trotskyists," led by Max Shachtman, formed a new revolutionary organization, 
the Workers Party (WP) which, a short time later, defined the Soviet Union as 
being a regime based on "bureaucratic collectivism" and denied that the CP was 
"a tendency within the workers movement."" 
Of the 1095 members1= in the organization before the division, Myers esti- 
mates that the SWP split "right down the middle, fifty-fifty," with 40 percent of 
the membership adhering to the minority faction (the Shachtmanites). Due to 
the loss of a certain percentage of members who did not affiliate with either 
group, the newly organized WP had 400 members at its inception in the spring 
of 1940, according to Peter Drucker.I3 
Besides being a dispute over political program, the Cannonites argued that 
the split had occurred along class lines with the "genuine proletarians" remain- 
ing with the SWP, and with the "petty bourgeois" members affiliating with the 
WP.I4 Gordon Haskell, who went with the WP in the split, admits that in 1940, 
the Shachtmanites "had practically no trade unionists" and that the WP "was 
really mostly a Youth organi~ation."'~ Thus, the break-up did not damage the 
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preliminary inroads that the SWP trade unionists had made in the US labor 
movement as a whole, and the UAW in particular at that time. 
Surveying the current state of the auto union in May 1940 only one month 
after the organizational split, the orthodox Trotskyists of the SWP believed that 
the UAW had "made no progress" in the last two years. In order to revitalize 
the union, the SWP auto unionists believed that it was necessary to build a lead- 
ership that would "launch the drive for the 30 hour week with 40 hour pay" in 
the auto industry, thus "creat[ing] the necessary precondition for a successful 
dnve at Fords [~ic]."'~ 
With respect to its own effectiveness within the UAW, the SWP realized 
that its recently formed national auto fraction was not functioning "in a nation- 
ally cohesive manner," with the Party trade unionists in California and 
Michigan, for example, adopting different positions on questions within the 
union. Although the SWP had 55 auto cadres as of May 1940, approximately 
half were unemployed at the time. The strongest concentrations of Party trade 
unionists in auto were in Detroit and Flint, and the SWP had fractions or at least 
the "beginnings of fractions" in Detroit, Flint, Cleveland, Allentown 
(Pennsylvania), Los Angeles, and "non-Party contacts in Saginaw and 
Pontiac.'"' 
The auto fraction secretary, Jules Geller, stated that it was necessary that all 
fractions consult with the National Center in Flint before making any local deci- 
sions because "[bly coordination our forces, small as they are, will obtain the 
maximum possible weight in the unions." Geller optimistically concluded, "if 
we keep our heads, we can emerge in the auto industry with a large member- 
ship and become an important section of the Auto Union."'* 
Although the WP had literally no trade unionists at its formation in May 
1940, this organization wasted little time in placing its young members, or "stu- 
dent youth," in unionized plants.I9 At the peak of production during World War 
11, approximately 80 percent of WP members were working at industrial jobs 
with many of the Party's trade unionists, active in the industrial unions, elected 
to positions ranging from shop steward and grievance committee chairman to 
local president in some cases." 
Of the unions in which the WP had penetrated during the wartime era, the 
group achieved its greatest success in the UAW even though the Party had not 
decided to concentrate on the auto industry at its formation in 1940. Beginning 
in March 1941, Party members were moved to Detroit and by the summer of 
1942, there were still only half a dozen party activists in auto work. However, 
by 1943, the WP had a "central concentration" of 50 cadres in the Detroit auto 
industry with a strong presence and influence in Willow Run Local 50 (Detroit), 
Brewster Local 365 (New York), and Bell Aircraft Local 501 (Buffal~).~' 
During the height of World War 11, the two wings of US Trotskyism num- 
bered approximately 200 UAW members with the SWP having 110 working in 
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auto while the WP possessed about 90. There were 840 SWP members in 1944, 
which meant that thirteen percent of the party was in the UAW with the largest 
SWP fractions being in Buick Local 6 (Chicago) with nineteen auto unionists, 
and Briggs Local 212 (Detroit) which had eighteen to twenty auto cadres in 
1945. With respect to the WP, the percentage was even higher with eighteen 
percent of the 500-member organization in auto.22 
Based on the two parties' analyses of the objective conditions facing the 
US working class during the World War I1 era, the SWP and the WP adopted 
divergent tactical orientations for their trade union work in the UAW. Because 
the SWP believed that the "relationship of forces" was not acting in the Party's 
favor due to "war patriotism, the subservience of the trade union bureaucracy, 
the absence of significant mass opposition, and our own isolation and weak- 
ness," from the start of the war until May 1945, the SWP carried out a "policy 
of caution" in its industrial work. In practice, this meant that the Party would 
seek "limited aims in the trade union movement" in which group members 
would attempt neither to obtain "big union posts" nor "to organize power cau- 
cuses," but to engage in intense educational work, penetration, and "solidifica- 
tion of our cadre in the unions, and party recr~itment."~~ 
In a directive to the auto fraction members in the Detroit branch in June 
1942, S W  Labor Secretary Farrell Dobbs clarified what the "policy of cau- 
tion" meant through his discussion of an error made by a cadre working in a 
small UAW shop of approximately 150 employees in Chicago. At a local union 
meeting, Comrade Rice, an executive board member, "introduced a resolution" 
which called on "the government to take over the plant" and to "turn it over to 
the workers to operate." Although the local's Executive Board passed the res- 
olution, the company discharged Rice for allegedly fomenting a work slow- 
down. Even though the local union voted to fight for Rice's reinstatement, and 
in favor of his resolution, the UAW International threatened to bring in replace- 
ment workers if a strike was called over the termination. The local filed an 
unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
but with the board slow to react, Rice remained out of work." 
According to Dobbs, there were a number of lessons to be learned from this 
incident in which the Party's position was compromised in the labor movement. 
Trade union cadre should not necessarily introduce resolutions at union meet- 
ings or oppose "every incorrect proposal" that is put forward by union officials 
but should prepare, through propaganda work, to "exert effective and growing 
influence when the next wave of mass action begins." In addition, in order to 
protect the SWP's standing within the unions, Dobbs stated that it was impera- 
tive that all resolutions to be introduced by Party members within the unions be 
approved beforehand by the National Trade Union Depart~nent.~~ 
On the other hand, the WP believed that wartime patriotism was not inter- 
fering with, what it perceived to be, burgeoning worker militancy in the indus- 
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trial plants. As opposed to the SWP, the WP encouraged the active participa- 
tion of its trade union cadre in seeking union posts, and adopted a syndicalist 
orientation in the organization of wartime strikes, believing that the mass of US 
workers were on the move.26 The WP considered the SWP's wartime trade 
union strategy to be one of "tail-endism," arguing in a 1942 resolution: 
We reject the false and essentially tail-endist and opportunist 
theory that the American workers are not in motion, are in a 
state of apathy, and will not move in defense of their rights 
and standards in the coming period. The contrary is the 
case .... Whoever argues that the American workers are today 
at rest . . . and cannot be made to move by militant leadership 
and guidance ... deserves a position as a benevolent trade 
union bureaucrat, but does not deserve the name of revolu- 
tionary sociali~t.~' 
Under the S W ' s  policy of caution, the progress made was slow and steady 
in the two major auto centers. For example, in Flint, an active group of Party 
members had been assembled through the Trotskyists' raid on the Socialist 
Party in 1937, in which they won over a number of UAW activists, including 
Kermit and Genora Johnson and the Johnsons' small band of followers. By 
November 1941, the Flint branch of fifteen members, with five being auto 
workers, engaged in a substantial amount of educational and organizational 
work in the auto industry. By April 1942, two SWP auto unionists had been 
successful in getting the first five African American workers employed at the 
Chevrolet plant in Flint. Because Kermit Johnson stood up for these workers, 
he was able to recruit all five of them to the Party.28 
The Flint members' fight on behalf of African American workers in the 
auto plants was representative of the SWP's national strategy in auto during the 
World War I1 era. SWP members were encouraged to battle for the rights of 
both African American and women workers at the point of production, wherev- 
er the Party exerted some influence. For example, in Buick Local 6, the S W  
fraction was instrumental in the struggle for obtaining African American work- 
ers jobs as semi-skilled machine operators and for gaining women workers 
equal pay for equal work.29 
In the Detroit branch during 1942, the primary focus was the rooting of the 
organization "into industry and into the trade unions." The local group felt that 
it had accomplished this goal with 81 percent of its membership "employed in 
industry and members of their respective trade unions" with 70 percent work- 
ing in the auto industry and enrolled as UAW members. The auto unionists 
were concentrated "in a few of the more important local unions," such as Briggs 
Local 212, Budd Wheel Local 306, and Fleetwood Local 15, as opposed to hav- 
ing "isolated comrades in many locals." Five auto fractions were functioning 
in the city in 1942 and four workers (two auto workers and two sailors) had 
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been recruited to the Detroit organization over the previous year.30 
Even though the two Trotskyist parties' tactical orientations were vastly 
different during World War 11, their analyses of the events and political devel- 
opments occurring within the UAW were strikingly similar. For the SWP, both 
factions of the auto union's leadership were too intimately connected with pro- 
moting Roosevelt's war program within the union, at the expense of the work- 
ers' best interests on and off of the shop floor. This included political support 
for the war, having UAW members forgo their right to strike during World War 
11, and approval by the union leadership of the War Labor Board (WLB) as the 
final arbiter of all industrial disputes during this period.31 
While acknowledging that the UAW was a very militant union "in the key 
war industry," the WP criticized the UAW leadership for "[tlheir pro-imperial- 
ist war, class-collaborationist politics" which led them to "to represent 
Roosevelt and his class in the ranks of the proletariat." The Party was opposed 
to the introduction of "incentive pay schemes" and the no-strike pledge as well 
as tying the union to the Roosevelt regime.32 
In addition, the WP critiqued the UAW's two major factions, specifically 
the Addes grouping, the faction led by George Addes who was elected 
Secretary-Treasurer of the UAW in 1946, for being dominated by the 
Communists and the Reuther-Leonard faction for being "a bureaucratic group 
of officials at the top." Concerning the Addes group, the WP argued that it pro- 
moted "the interests of the reactionary Russian bureaucracy" within the union 
and that "[tlhe most conscious, best-organized and most dangerous right wing 
in the labor movement today is the Stalinist wing." While the Reuther Caucus 
was considered to be a centrist group within the context of the US trade union 
movement, its major problem was that it encouraged policies of "class collab- 
oration with the 'democratic' capitalists," and with respect to the key issues 
confronting the union, it compromised and capitulated before these  capitalist^.'^ 
At the national level, both the SWP and the WP auto cadre took a leading 
role in the struggle within the UAW against the no-strike pledge. As well, in 
1944, both groups were instrumental in the establishment of the Rank and File 
Caucus (RFC), the political vehicle of this appositional movement. The two 
sections of US Trotskyism viewed World War I1 as an "imperialist rivalry" 
between the capitalist nations and "counterposed the fight for socialism and the 
interests of the working class to the victory of either side in the conflict." Since 
the pledge interfered with the workers' ability to effectively press for their 
demands on and off the shop floor, the Trotskyists vehemently contested its 
existence. 
The no-strike pledge only became important as a matter of concern at the 
Ninth Annual UAW Convention in September 1944. However, because of the 
Trotskyists' activity in a number of locals, there was opposition to this policy at 
the 1943 convention. For example, because of the leadership role adopted by 
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the SWP fraction in Buick Local 6 over this issue, it became the first Chicago- 
area UAW local to pass a resolution calling for the rescinding of the pledge in 
September 1943. Although it was solidly reafirmed at the 1943 convention, 
the delegates from three locals unanimously voted against the continuation of 
this policy: Buick Local 599 (Flint) and Chevrolet Local 659 (Flint), which had 
significant SWP fractions, as well as Olds Local 652 (Lansing). Five addition- 
al locals, including Buick Local 6, gave the vast majority of their votes to the 
pledge's revoca t i~n .~~ 
The fight over the no-strike pledge at the 1944 UAW convention was bit- 
ter, with three different resolutions, two minority and one majority, presented 
on the convention floor. The first minority report, referred to as the super- 
minority motion, which was backed by both wings of US Trotskyism and their 
allies within the UAW, proposed that this policy be immediately rescinded and 
called for a referendum vote to be held 60 days after the convention's adjourn- 
ment. The second minority resolution, labeled the minority report, requested 
that the pledge be continued but exempted from coverage all factories reverting 
to civilian production upon the military defeat of Germany. Finally, the major- 
ity report advocated that the pledge be continued with a "review" to take place 
upon Germany's downfall.35 
A vigorous debate occurred at the gathering with at least some workers 
viewing patriotism'and opposition to the no-strike policy as being consistent 
positions for UAW members to adopt.36 When the final votes were cast, the del- 
egates rejected all three resolutions. This led to the approval of a reworked 
report that reaffirmed the pledge while calling for a membership referendum on 
the issue.-" 
In addition to the leadership role adopted by the Trotskyist auto unionists, 
other RFC organizers included "the veteran secondary leaders in Michigan" 
from major urban locals who fought this policy based on their own wartime 
experience. Although most of the leaders and members of the caucus did not 
share the Trotskyists' views on the imperialist nature of World War 11, these 
trade unionists, however, felt that there was no contradiction in both supporting 
the war and in revoking the no-strike pledge. To them, it was an essential trade 
union tactic that had to be put in place because they felt that the current policy 
hampered and divided their local unions.38 
The caucus' organizers came primarily from Buick Local 6 (Chicago), 
Chrysler Local 7 (Detroit), Fleetwood Local 15 (Detroit), Willow Run Local 50 
(Detroit), Briggs Local 212 (Detroit), Brewster Local 365 (New York), and 
Buick Local 599 (Flint). With the possible exception of Chrysler Local 7, all 
of these locals contained active SWP andlor WP fractions operating during 
World War II.39 
According to Jack Conway, an unaffiliated socialist who worked closely 
with the SWP trade unionists in Buick Local 6, the W C  played an integral role 
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at the 1944 UAW Convention: 
[Tlhe third caucus tied the convention up for about two days. 
We forced the thing [the issue of the no-strike pledge] to a roll 
call vote and eventually to a referendum of the membership. 
We refused to associate ourselves with either political group 
in the international union until this and other questions were 
After the meeting, Local 6 with its large S W  fraction took the lead in prepar- 
ing for the important mail poll on the no-strike pledge. A h11 two-page adver- 
tisement ran in the November 1944 edition of the local's newspaper under the 
title, "REVOKE THE NO STRIKE PLEDGE." In order to build support for its 
elimination, Buick Local 6 sent 25 000 copies of this ad to other UAW locals 
throughout the na t i~n .~ '  
When the ballots were tallied in March 1945, fewer than 300 000 workers, 
or about 30 percent of the UAW membership, had actually voted. By a two-to- 
one margin, the no-strike pledge was reaffirmed although in Detroit and Flint, 
the contest was considerably closer. In these two cities, where the S W  and the 
WP had concentrated its fractional work within the auto union, opponents of the 
policy obtained approximately 45 percent of the vote.42 
Post-World War 11: The Struggle for Control of the UAW 
During World War 11, the C10 unions grew dramatically and had become stabi- 
lized largely through the dues check-off and the maintenance of membership 
clauses granted by the WLB in exchange for unions agreeing to the no-strike 
pledge. And by the war's end, of the industrial federation's affiliates, the UAW 
had definitively established itself as the premier union in what could be legiti- 
mately defined as an increasingly laborite nation. However, with auto workers 
temporarily laid off upon conversion of defense plants from wartime to domes- 
tic production, it became clear that the major problem confronting the United 
States was not production but rather consumption. 
To this end, in the postwar period, the UAW assumed the vanguard role in 
the trade union movement in developing a privatized welfare state for auto 
workers by fighting for increased wages and an array of benefits which would 
help protect its membership from the vagaries of the capitalist economy's busi- 
ness cycles. This focus of the auto union fit nicely with the emerging 
Keynesian position that it was necessary to maintain aggregate demand and to 
redistribute income to prevent an economic slump.43 The UAW's 1945-1946 
strike at GM was the opening salvo in the battle to achieve these objectives. 
Other unions in a variety of industries, including steel, electrical, and railroad, 
followed the autoworkers' lead when they struck their employers during the 
1946 strike wave, which has been the largest in the United States up to the pres- 
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ent time. 
With the end of both World War I1 and the no-strike pledge, the RFC dis- 
appeared as a militant force in the UAW. This caucus' collapse did not lead to 
the demoralization of the SWP cadre, who maintained their auto union fractions 
during the industrial plants' postwar conversion to domestic production. In 
fact, the number of SWP members in the UAW increased by nearly 35 percent 
from 110 during World War I1 to 148 by October 1946 with the Party's major 
auto concentrations surviving and expanding in Detroit, Flint, Toledo, and 
Buffalo. Numerically speaking, the UAW was the SWP's largest trade union 
fraction, with maritime ranked second, and steel third. Of the 646 trade union- 
ists in the Party in the fall of 1946, almost one out of four (22.9 percent) were 
in the auto workers' union.M 
Having developed stable groups in the auto, steel, and maritime industries 
among others, in the 1946 strike wave, the SWP became caught up in what the 
veteran Trotskyist labor writer Art Preis termed "American labor's greatest 
upsurge." With 44 percent of the Party's membership in unions, the Cannonites 
were exhilarated with the success of these worker struggles and believed that 
these events offered opportunities for the spread and penetration of Trotskyism 
in the United States. Achieving 1470 members by 1946, a figure almost three 
times as large as that after the Shachtmanite split in April 1940, the SWP 
believed that it was poised for real growth in the post-war per i~d ."~  
In the flood of militancy at the war's end, the UAW played a leading role 
in channeling worker discontent into concrete demands to advance the labor 
movement. In making a sharp turn to the left, Reuther launched a strike against 
General Motors (GM) in November 1945 that lasted 11 3 days. In this walkout, 
Reuther put forward a "GM Program" which called for a 30 percent increase in 
workers' wages, a freeze on car prices, and included the Trotskyist slogan of 
opening the company's books to the union,46 demands which fired the imagina- 
tion of the SWP auto unionists. 
In connection with the commencement of the strike late in 1945, the SWP 
inaugurated a Party drive in Flint and Detroit which involved "an intense prop- 
aganda campaign" combined with "direct intervention in the union" through the 
auto cadre and sympathizing workers. Besides covering the developments of 
the work stoppage in detail in The Militant, Party members launched "a more 
wide-spread distribution" of the S W ' s  press in major strike areas. The Party 
also conducted a series of meetings in which the organization presented its 
analysis of the strike "with particularly good results in Flint." Finally, the 
Detroit branch organizer delivered three speeches concerning the walkout over 
a radio station that had been used in the past by the CIO. With respect to "direct 
intervention in the union," the Flint and Detroit auto unionists were able to 
"pass various propositions" at local union meetings which helped the SWP to 
solidify its strength in two UAW locals in Flint and "to form a bloc with sever- 
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a1 other GM locals" in Detroit."' 
The Party was heartened by the walkout, feeling that, on a technical level, 
it was extremely well conducted, incorporating "all the old ideas of strike 
organization which radicals have fought for over many years ... as a matter of 
course - picketing, flying squadrons, kitchens, strike meetings, etc." The 
SWP also applauded the attitude of the union leadership, claiming "they have 
on the hndamental demand of the strike been adamant."48 
Although the Cannonites believed that the union had emerged victorious 
upon the work stoppage's conclusion and that the working class had obtained 
some real gains, they tempered their enthusiasm for the settlement with some 
sober criticism. The SWP argued, however, that more could have been 
achieved in this strike "had the strategy of the leadership been better, had there 
been greater unity and willingness on the part of the leadership to struggle in a 
united fa~hion."'~ 
At a mid-February 1946 conference held for the Detroit trade union cadre 
to discuss and analyze recent developments within the auto union, the partici- 
pants concluded that Reuther's leftward turn was "so impressive" that "all the 
leading and most active union militants ... consider themselves as Reuther sup- 
porters." Because of this, the SWP trade unionists decided to work within "the 
broad Reuther caucus" if one was established at the upcoming UAW conven- 
tion. Expecting to have "a larger party delegation" at this gathering and with 
the ultimate goal being to build a substantial and active left wing in the UAW, 
the auto unionists would push for, within the caucus and on the convention 
floor, three programmatic points which included "a fight against the company 
security clause, a fight against any kind of cooperation with the fact-finding 
committees and for a labor party."50 
While the SWP had made organizational gains within a number of Flint and 
Detroit UAW locals during the 1945- 1946 GM strike, the WP faced the major 
problem of retaining its industrial base upon the conclusion of World War 11. 
When the war ended, a number of Shachtmanites lost their jobs with the return 
of prewar workers from the army. However, in Detroit, many members with 
secure jobs in auto left voluntarily to return to school or to take professional 
jobs. Thus, by May 1946, the Party's trade union work was considered to be 
"all but dise~tablished."~' 
Statistics from the WP's first trade union census, reported at the end of July 
1946, and membership figures from 1946, reveal the severity of the problem. 
From an industrial penetration rate of approximately 80 percent during the war 
period, a little over 43 percent of Party members were working at industrial jobs 
with approximately 28 percent laboring in unionized shops. Although the cen- 
sus and the union affiliation breakdown indicated that Shachtmanites were 
enrolled in fifteen C10 unions, 21 AFL unions and three independent unions, 
the UAW with 48 WP members, contained, by far, the largest concentration of 
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unionists and was still the major focus of the Party's trade union 
At the center of the Detroit auto industry, the WP initiated a serious attempt 
in 1946 to reestablish itself as a key force. The Shachtmanites believed that the 
route for carrying this out was "to become the active left-wing of the Reuther 
caucus" through their vigorous promotion of the GM program combined with 
advocacy of creating a Labor Party. Initially, the Party experienced difficulty 
in establishing fractions in the Detroit UAW shops due to the layoffs and shifts 
of activists. This made organizational work in the factories "diffuse, sporadic 
and individualistic" in nature. By early 1947, the WP had created two fractions 
in Detroit UAW local unions - one of five party members in a major UAW 
local, as well as a second smaller fraction in another auto union local - with 
the remaining cadre in the industry in Detroit functioning essentially "as isolat- 
ed individuals" in UAW shops. The auto unionists in the Party's largest frac- 
tion became known as "ardent advocates" of both the GM program and the cre- 
ation of a Labor Party. In addition to these activities, they participated in griev- 
ance struggles and the brief walkouts that occurred in the plant, were invited to 
attend and join the Reuther Caucus, and became leaders of the faction's veter- 
ans committee. They also wrote the seven point program for the caucus which 
called for wage raises without price increases, escalator and anti-discrimination 
clauses, and the directing of the CIO's Political Action Committee towards 
independent political action.53 
Shachtman appeared to be even more enthusiastic about the success of the 
strike and what it meant for the future of the US trade union movement as a 
whole than the SWP. In a letter addressed to all Party members, Shachtman 
argued that "the auto workers may be considered as the most advanced section 
of the American working class" and that "[wlhat they think and say and do 
today the rest of the working class will think and say and do in due time." 
Because of this, Shachtman claimed that WP members "must become the most 
consistent and radical champions of the GM program" by "mobiliz[ing] support 
for Reuther but on the basis of our program, our interpretation of the GM pro- 
gram, of w critical attitude towards Reuther himself."54 
Both the WP and the SWP supported Reuther in the 1946 UAW elections, 
although the SWP's support was more decisive because the group had many 
more delegates at the convention than the WP. Reuther won the presidency of 
the UAW International over R. J. Thomas by a razor thin margin of 114 votes 
out of 8761 votes cast at the union's tenth convention in March 1946.55 
According to Sol Dollinger, an SWP auto trade unionist in 1946, the Party was 
crucial in electing Reuther because it "had something like 25 to 35, maybe even 
more party delegates" at the 1946 UAW Convention with each delegate carry- 
ing "an average of 4, 5, 6 or 7 votes," providing Reuther with his margin of vic- 
t o r ~ . ~ ~  The WP's fraction at this convention of nearly 2000 delegates, included 
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three delegates and one alternate as well as "three or four militants and sympa- 
thizer~."~' 
While the Shachtmanites backed and actively worked for the victory of the 
Reuther Caucus in its fight with the Addes-Communist faction in the 1946 con- 
test "as the lesser of two evils," after the election the Party felt that it was nec- 
essary to try to build an independent force within the union in opposition to 
Reuther. The WP called for its auto cadre to organize fairly broad progressive 
groups within the UAW that would not only include the Party members and 
sympathizers but left-wing Reutherites, as well as non-CP supporters of the 
Addes-Communist faction. Only after a period of intense educational work and 
experience with the class-collaborationist character of the Reuther leadership, 
according to the WP, would these groups be able to assume independence and 
exert decisive influence within the union.5R 
Although the Reuther Caucus did not consolidate control of the UAW until 
the 1947 convention, the SWP and the WP realized that the November 1947 
convention would be vital in determining the union's future. Thus, as opposed 
to both parties uniting behind Reuther in 1946, the two organizations provided 
elaborate reasons for backing different caucuses at the 1947 convention. 
Considering the reality of the situation in the UAW, the Shachtmanite posi- 
tion in 1947 was that the Reuther Caucus should be supported because "the 
great bulk of the most advanced and progressive militants," that is "the left wing 
of the UAW," are located in this faction. The WP argued that the activists in 
this grouping (not Reuther himself) were primarily responsible for carrying on 
the fight against the no-strike pledge and incentive pay, and were crucial in the 
struggles against the unions' participation on the WLB and for promoting the 
idea of an independent Labor Party during World War 11. In the immediate 
postwar era, these militants also advocated the, "in its implications, revolution- 
ary" GM program while the Addes faction was "vehemently opposed" to it. 
Because of this, the Party stated that it was necessary to support the Reuther 
Caucus, adopting the following formula, "We are not Reutherites, but we sup- 
port Re~ the r . "~~  
While the WP auto cadre opposed the implementation of the Taft-Hartley 
Act, the SWP auto trade unionists actively organized against the bill's imple- 
mentation in the spring of 1947. Two SWP members in Detroit, Ernest Mazey 
of Briggs Local 2 12 and John Anderson, president of Fleetwood Local 15, were 
instrumental in coordinating the 24 April 1947 Cadillac Square demonstration 
in opposition to the Taft-Hartley bill. In this protest, which may have been the 
largest labor rally ever held in US history, a total of 500 000 workers left their 
factories with 250 000 of them assembling in Detroit's Cadillac Sq~are.~ '  
Concerning the factional struggle within the UAW, early in the spring of 
1947, the SWP auto activists argued that the fight between the Reuther Caucus 
and the Thomas-Addes bloc constituted "struggles over posts and appoint- 
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ments" and that both factions should cease "their shameful bickering." With 
respect to the Reuther grouping, the Party argued that it was "bereft of any pro- 
gram to meet the present employer-government offensive" and that it was using 
red-baiting tactics against the Thomas-Addes faction. The SWP expressed con- 
cern that the Reuther Caucus was solidifying its support around two conserva- 
tive forces, the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists and the union's skilled 
trades di~ision.~' 
In terms of the Thomas-Addes faction, the Cannonites claimed that it was 
led "by narrow-minded machine politicians," which were backed by the 
Communists, whose program in the face of the employer offensive was no bet- 
ter than that of the Reuther Caucus. However, on a positive note, the SWP 
claimed that it did have "a far better position and record" on the issue of red- 
baiting within the union.62 
At this time, the Party's position was to favor neither caucus at the nation- 
al level. The SWP argued that it would not make such a decision at this time 
about which faction to support at the next convention but would "cross that 
bridge when we come to it." Although the SWP's goal was to organize inde- 
pendent groups in as many local unions as possible, the Party recognized that it 
lacked sufficient forces to build a third independent progressive group except in 
"a few isolated instances." Therefore, the Cannonites' strategy in the local 
unions was to "work in or cooperate with that grouping whose overall charac- 
ter is most progressive." This meant that in some locals the SWP would collab- 
orate with the Reuther Caucus; in other locals, it would form an alliance with 
the Thomas-Addes faction, while in local unions where the Party's influence 
was more substantial, the SWP auto cadre would work with a third independent 
group.63 
In practice, this policy was somewhat problematic. As pointed out in an 
SWP Internal Bulletin, such an approach often led "to conflicting actions of not 
only branches, but also of comrades within a branch." For example, the 
Chicago branch, which at the time was supporting the Reuther Caucus, opposed 
the proposed entry of the Farm Equipment Workers Union into the UAW, while 
the Detroit branch, which backed the Thomas-Addes faction, favored the merg- 
er." 
As the convention neared, the SWP changed its position believing that 
"[glreat and important things for labor are at stake in this fight" between the 
two major factions. Specifically, the Party argued that the Reuther Caucus was 
organized on an "outright reactionary basis" which rested on "the most conser- 
vative and even reactionary layers of the union," employing "red-baiting" as a 
major tactic. In defense of the characterization of this grouping, the SWP noted 
that "the most influential single bloc" in the caucus was "the sinister priest-rid- 
den Association of Catholic Trade  unionist^."^^ 
In supporting the opposition Thomas-Addes-Leonard faction, the 
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Cannonites claimed that it had an "over-all more progressive character," and a 
higher percentage of union militants in its ranks, most notably in Michigan, 
than the Reuther Caucus. As opposed to the one-man, dictatorial control of the 
Reuther grouping, the Thomas-Addes-Leonard Caucus exhibited "a greater 
degree of democracy" composed of "a coalition of independent leaders," which 
was "more tolerant of left-wingers and willing to cooperate with them."66 
Furthermore, the SWP argued that the faction had taken a "militant stand 
against the Taft-Hartley Act," unlike that of the Reuther Caucus that was will- 
ing to comply with the signing of the non-Communist affidavits required by the 
law. In addition, another major reason to back the faction was that the 
Communists were on the decline in the grouping and no longer exerted a major 
influence in the 
Reuther's victory in 1947 had severe consequences for the future of the 
SWP auto unionists. In a speech to his caucus following his election victory, 
Reuther stated that he intended to actively "attack members of left-wing politi- 
cal groups who disagreed with his policies." When asked directly by a delegate 
which groups in the UAW he was referring to, the charismatic leader made it 
clear that he wanted to eliminate two radical left parties, the large CP group 
within the union and the SWP activists who were influential in a number of 
major UAW locals.68 
Even after the Reuther Caucus secured its control of the union in the fall of 
1947, the SWP trade unionists still attempted to help build an independent and 
progressive rank-and-file caucus within the auto union. In August 1948, at the 
national level, the SWP auto cadre participated in the formation of the 
"Committee for a Militant and Democratic UAW" (CMD) that developed "a 
militant program of action for union security, against the high cost of living and 
speed-up, for independent labor political action and for union militancy and 
democracy." The group, whose chairman was Richard T. Leonard, a former 
UAW vice-president and president of DeSoto Local 227 (Detroit) at the time, 
organized a conference in Michigan of 350 UAW members from major locals 
in Detroit such as Ford 600, Dodge 3, Hudson 154, Briggs 212, Budd 306, Tool 
& Die 155 and 157, and two leading Flint locals, Buick 599 and Chevrolet 
659.6y 
In locals that the SWP retained significant influence in, it was still organ- 
izing independent groups against the Reutherite caucuses in 1947 and 1948. 
One of these was Chevrolet Local 659 (Flint), which had seventeen SWP mem- 
bers from 1946 through 1951, largely due to Sol Dollinger's successful recruit- 
ing work. In addition, the local contained a group of "militant class-conscious 
workers" with syndicalistic tendencies that supported the Trotskyists in union 
affairs. After Reuther consolidated control of the UAW in 1947, the Trotskyists 
and their supporters joined the local's Thomas-Addes Caucus and took over its 
leadership, even though the group still contained a number of CP members. In 
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1948, for the local union elections, the Trotskyists were instrumental in estab- 
lishing a new caucus, United Independents (U&I), with the CP trade unionists 
in which U&I won. After this vote, the SWP trade unionists continued to fight 
for obtaining the escalator clause, also referred to as either the sliding scale of 
wages or cost of living increases, in the 1948 ~ontract.~' 
The success of the campaign for the escalator clause in UAW contracts was 
largely due to the role of the Flint SWP auto unionists, especially Jack Palmer, 
who was elected president of Chevrolet Local 659 in 1947, and Sol Dollinger, 
who developed a plan for promoting the sliding scale of wages shortly after 
Palmer assumed the local union's presidency. Because of eroding wages due to 
inflation, a number of UAW locals in 1947, especially those that had active 
SWP fractions, had been pushing for linking wages to the rising cost of living. 
The major concern of the Trotskyist auto cadre was that with a predicted surge 
in inflation, any new wage gains achieved in the 1948 contract could also be 
easily eradi~ated.~' 
After the Palmer-Dollinger proposal of a $0.25 per hour wage increase, 
combined with a cost-of-living adjustment based on changes in the inflation 
rate for the 1948 contract was approved at a Chevrolet Local 659 meeting, the 
plan also was enthusiastically accepted at a meeting of the five Flint UAW local 
union presidents, two of whom were SWP supporters (Bill Connolly of Fisher 
Body 2 and Bob Carter of AC Sparkplug). Since the five auto locals in Flint 
represented 40 000 GM workers, this wage proposal was significant. When it 
made the headlines of the three Detroit newspapers, other UAW locals, which 
represented 250 000 workers, passed similar resolutions believing, as the 
Detroit papers did, that Reuther was actually behind the program coming out of 
Flint.'= 
In spite of Reuther's vigorous efforts to kill the plan, the escalator clause 
became a reality in UAW contracts. While Reuther was recovering in the hos- 
pital from an assassin's attempt on his life at the end of April 1948, GM pro- 
posed a clause containing the sliding scale of wages, similar to the resolution 
put forward by the five Flint local presidents, to the UAW bargaining comrnit- 
tee. After a few modifications, this becamt~;the cost-of-living clause that is still 
present in auto union contracts to this day. 
Within several years after the Reuther Caucus consolidated its control, the 
two groups' strategies of building a militant rank-and-file movement in the auto 
union was dashed on the rocks of political reality for different reasons. In the 
SWP, the atmosphere resulting from the expulsion of the eleven CP-led unions 
from the C10 in 1949-1950 narrowed the Party's possibilities within the UAW. 
Beginning in 1948, the strategic and tactical differences between the 
Midwestern trade unionists (the Cochranites) and the Party leadership surfaced 
over the group's desire to orient the organization around the CP trade union 
ranks and its periphery in order to recruit new members. Although this policy 
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was denounced as being "soft on Stalinism," the SWP subsequently allowed the 
auto cadre to work with the R. J. Thomas CP fraction in opposition to Reuther's 
efforts to eliminate them from union leadership positions. This schism eventu- 
ally led to the Cochranites' expulsion from the Party in August 1953, which 
decimated the major trade union fractions in the auto, rubber, and steel indus- 
In 1949, the WP renamed itself the Independent Socialist League (ISL) and 
in the next few years it moved away, in both a theoretical and practical sense, 
from a brand of "unorthodox" Trotskyism to a Marxism that was more repre- 
sentative of a variant of left-wing social democracy. By the late summer of 
1949, the ISL's orientation towards building a militant rank-and-file group in 
the UAW had virtually disintegrated. At this time, Shachtrnan abandoned the 
idea of constructing an independent movement in opposition to Reuther, no 
longer believing that there was an "inherent conflict of interest" between union 
officialdom and rank-and-file workers on the shop floor.75 
While in the immediate postwar period, the WP auto cadre considered 
themselves to be "critical Reutherites," by 1949, the ISL auto trade unionists 
had been fully integrated into the Reuther Caucus and had been clearly trans- 
formed into both loyal and "uncritical Reutherites." In a policy statement pre- 
pared by Herman Benson in August 1949, he referred to Reuther as the "unchal- 
lengeable single leader" who had turned the UAW into the "vanguard of the 
American labor movement." When provided with a choice of potential leaders, 
ISL trade unionists would back "more progressive Reutherites" as opposed to 
conservative ones, but the organization of an independent challenge to Reuther 
was discarded as a foolish 
This political direction of the ISL was confirmed by the auto cadre at the 
organization's UAW conference in Cleveland, held in early September 1949. 
Attended by approximately 50 people (ISL members, visitors, and contacts 
from the auto union) including 27 UAW members from fifteen different locals 
and nine cities, the ISL activists overwhelmingly endorsed the general line to 
be carried out in the union, presented in Ben Hall's (a pseudonym for Herman 
Benson) document, "Situation in the UAW." Upon discussion of the organiza- 
tion's orientation to the CIO's Political Action Committee, for the first time in 
WPIISL history, consideration was given to supporting "bourgeois," that is 
Democratic Party, candidates in electoral politics, believing that the road to the 
Labor Party in the United States may lie in supporting such nominees at times." 
Hall's written statement argued that the Reuther group could no longer be 
considered a faction because it included approximately 95 percent of the 
activists within the union, encompassing both officials and rank-and-file mili- 
tants. However, within the caucus there were two competing wings - an amor- 
phous progressive grouping and a conservative one dominated by business 
unionism - which Hall saw coming into conflict with each other. Since any 
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progressive group in the UAW, in the immediate period, was unlikely to arise 
in opposition to Reuther, he argued that such a movement was likely to emerge 
from the more militant section of the Reuther Caucus. Therefore, it was the 
duty of the ISL auto unionists to function within the left wing of this bloc: 
We do not favor the formation of splinter grouplets without 
any real mass following such as the Silver Committee. Such 
a policy can only divorce the socialists from the real left wing 
within the existing Reuther group. To stimulate its rise as a 
genuinely independent factor, we function as part of the 
Reuther group as presently constituted, considering ourselves 
a critical tendency within it supporting those proposals and 
those individuals which best represent the militant and dem- 
ocratic vanguard traditions of the union.'* 
Thus, the document concluded, "where on a local scale, as has already occurred 
in some cases, two opposing Reuther caucuses are formed, separating the more 
militant from the more conservative, we, of course, support the former and 
favor its continued independent existence as a left wing stimulus in the whole 
Reuther 
Consistent with this policy orientation, the Shachtmanite trade unionists 
harshly criticized the behavior of the CMD at the Twelfth UAW Convention in 
1949. While the ISL recognized that the caucus "enrolls genuinely progressive 
anti-Stalinists who were part of the Addes-Thomas-Stalinist bloc," the organi- 
zation referred to it as "an infinitesimal grouplet at the convention7' which had 
literally no influence in the union. The Party stated that faction members, 
including the SWP, had fooled themselves into thinking that the CMD "was 
genuinely progressive and militant," in addition to falsely believing that the 
union was controlled by a conservative and bureaucratic caucus. Furthermore, 
the ISL argued that "[tlhe vast majority of militants in the UAW are now behind 
Reuther" and that "it is impossible at this time to distinguish clearly between a 
militant program and Reuther's program," claiming that "[tlhe delegates have 
rallied to Reuther precisely to achieve a militant and democratic pr~grarn."'~ 
Analyzing the Role of the Trotskyists in the UAW, 1939-1949 
In order to better analyze the operation of the SWP and the WP within the UAW, 
it is important to compare their programs to that of the CP, the major left-wing 
force, within the union from 1939 to 1949. During this decade the Communists 
never sought to organize an independent left-wing opposition movement to the 
trade union bureaucracy, but participated in "left-center coalitions," which the 
Party first developed as a strategy within the Trade Union Educational League 
(TUEL) for "boring from within" the AFL unions, that is working within the 
federation's affiliates to win members over to the League's positions, during the 
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late 1920s. Aligning with the Socialists in the Unity Caucus, the CP was the 
dominant force in the UAW's leading faction, which the Trotskyists later 
joined, when the union split in early 1939.8' 
However, shortly after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact, this left-center 
coalition collapsed. Due to the Communists' sudden change in foreign policy 
and the Party's refusal to go along with the UAW leadership's programmatic 
shift concerning the desirability of strikes in defense-related industries, this 
alliance was disrupted with the attack on the Party at the 1940 and 1941 UAW 
conventions. In early 1942, however, with the commencement of US involve- 
ment in World War 11, the CP reestablished its left-center coalition within the 
CIO's industrial unions as well as the UAW. Capitalizing on the patriotic sen- 
timent of the workers, the Party pushed for the implementation of incentive pay 
and the no-strike pledge in order to aid the allied war effort of the United States 
and the Soviet Union." 
Similar to the Cannonites, the Communists fought for the rights of African 
American workers and pay equality for women in the auto plants during the war 
years. However, unlike the SWP, in the CP's case, these struggles were often 
subordinated to the Party's objective of vigorously supporting an allied victory 
in World War 11. In the post-war period, the Communists attempted to keep its 
left-center coalition intact through its participation in the Thomas-Addes group. 
But the beginning of the Cold War and Reuther's vigorous attacks on the Party 
led to Communists being purged from the international staff and from leader- 
ship positions in UAW locals.83 
It is apparent that the two wings of US Trotskyism in the UAW from 1939 
to 1949 adopted a different political program and tactics compared to that of the 
CP during this era. Although considerably less powerful and influential than 
the Communists, from the evidence presented in this article, the SWP and the 
WP were clearly the most successful when they acted in broader progressive 
movements which attracted the participation of an extensive segment of mili- 
tant UAW members. During the World War I1 period, this became evident 
through the building of the independent W C  in which both the SWP and WP 
auto trade union cadre participated. 
However, when the two organizations acted as vanguardparties of the rev- 
olution, they experienced considerably less success in the auto union during the 
war and the immediate postwar periods. For example, in spite of their success 
in mobilizing UAW members around a number of important issues such as 
Reuther's militant GM program, opposition to the Taft-Hartley bill, and promo- 
tion of the escalator clause, in addition to distributing hundreds, if not thou- 
sands, of copies of The Militant and Labor Action each week among auto work- 
ers in major industrial centers, the SWP and the WP were able to recruit only a 
handful of new auto workers to their organizations and party programs. 
Once the Reuther Caucus secured its control of the UAW in 1947, the task 
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to organize auto workers around a militant program within the union became 
more difficult for the two parties. In supporting the Thomas-Addes-Leonard 
group within the union at the 1947 convention, the SWP correctly perceived 
that the victory of the Reuther Caucus would eventually lead to the elimination 
of the UAW's left wing, not only the CP trade union cadre but the opposition 
Trotskyist trade unionists as well. In spite of Reuther's triumph, the SWP still 
attempted to construct an independent and militant movement among auto 
workers at both the national and local levels in the late 1940s. However, by 
1949, with the increasing bureaucratization of the UAW and the CIO, the 
opportunity for left-wing activity in the industrial unions declined with the 
purge of the CP-led C10 unions. In response, the Cochranites proposed that 
they unite with the CP trade unionists and its periphery in keeping a broad left 
tradition alive in both the UAW and the labor movement as a whole. 
However, if the SWP and the WP had adopted different tactics within the 
UAW in attempting to organize an autonomous radical movement in opposition 
to the union's bureaucracy, these two groups might have had more success act- 
ing as vanguard parties. Had the Cannonites and the Shachtmanites established 
independent caucuses, rather than forming blocs or alliances based on irnmedi- 
ate issues, no matter how principled they were, the two Trotskyist groups may 
have been able to distinguish themselves from their coalition partners and may 
have been more successful in attracting workers to their left-wing programs and 
organizations. Elucidation of this point will be made through an examination 
of the evolution of Trotskyist trade union policy with regards to the SWP. 
Basing its trade union program on the Transitional Program as created by 
Trotsky in 1938 and the first four congresses of the Communist International 
through 1923, the Trotskyist auto unionists did not always follow these pre- 
scriptions. For example, the SWP supported the work of the CP's trade union 
arm, the TUEL "boring from within" the AFL during the 1922-23 period. At 
this time, the League, as a "membership organization of Communist trade 
unionists," was established to inject "the Communist program into the trade 
unions." As such, it organized broad campaigns around major demands of the 
TUEL's program in forming "united fronts" with sections of the trade-union 
bureaucracy for mobilizing workers against the majority of the officialdom. 
However, by the late 1920s, with the Stalinization of the Communist 
International, the CP had turned the TUEL into an organization which would 
form blocs with other progressives, characterized as the "left-center coalition," 
basically abandoning the Party's political program within the unions. What this 
meant for the Communist trade unionists was to attempt to obtain the best 
alliance that could be achieved, but, in practice, to attain a bloc "at any price."84 
Although the Trotskyists supported the formation of dual unions in certain 
industries in the late 1920s, where the CP could no longer effectively work 
within the AFL unions due'to bureaucratic opposition, it was highly critical of 
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the party's transformation of the TUEL into the dual unionist Trade Union 
Unity League (TUUL). The Trotskyists argued that the formation of the TUUL 
unions was a betrayal of authentic Communist policy in the AFL unions 
because it allowed the conservative bureaucratic leadership to remain in control 
without being sufficiently challenged from the leftR5 
As the Trotskyists became active in some of the newly formed industrial 
unions during the mid to late 1930s, their trade union work began to exhibit 
similar problems that would become apparent within the UAW from 1939 to 
1949. The SWP trade unionists formed blocs with "progressives" at the top lev- 
els of the industrial unions, rather than steering an independent course where 
the Party would present its political program to rank-and-file workers. While 
establishing temporary alliances and united fronts over pressing issues within 
the C10 unions, the Trotskyists had engaged in a principled struggle over its 
program and had not created unprincipled blocs. However, the major predica- 
ment that the SWP confronted was that it had become virtually indistinguish- 
able from its coalition partners rather than viewed as an independent left-wing 
force by establishing its own caucuses within the unions.86 
Although the SWP's "policy of caution" led to inaction during the early 
years of the World War I1 period, this lack of activity had a positive side in that 
it prevented the Trotskyists from forming inappropriate alliances with any sec- 
tion of the UAW's trade union officialdom, all of which supported the war, 
Roosevelt, and the no-strike pledge. However, with growing opposition to the 
pledge in the auto plants, the Party became active organizers of the W C .  
Although this grouping was based on politically independent secondary-level 
leaders, and represented only a limited break with reformism, it was "qualita- 
tively to the left of the bureaucracy as a whole" and represented the peak of 
Trotskyist trade-union activity within the auto union.87 
The SWP's orientation to post-World War I1 trade union work was revealed 
in a response to the formation of a departing internal faction, the Goldman- 
Morrow group, who shared the Shachtmanites' Stalinophobia and wanted to 
reunite with the WP. When one of this faction's members criticized the Party's 
"policy of caution" for not providing leadership to workers engaged in struggle, 
the Party majority stated that "third group" caucuses similar to the RFC would 
not be used as a universal standard in the post-war period. It argued that a left 
wing in the industrial unions could not be mechanically produced by handing 
the workers an already established program but could emerge only by partici- 
pating within the existing major caucuses.88 
Within the context of the UAW after World War 11, this meant that the SWP 
auto unionists would work within either the Reuther Caucus or the Thomas- 
Addes faction. Thus, in 1946, the Party supported and oriented itself towards 
"the more progressive bureaucratic reformists" of the Reuther Caucus due to 
the combative strike led by Reuther against GM and because most of the mili- 
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tant workers were found in that faction. However, after Reuther's 1946 elec- 
tion victory, the SWP switched its support to that of the Thomas-Addes Caucus 
because of Reuther's increasing anti-Communism, the activist workers' disgust 
with the charismatic leader, and his drive to attain one-man tyrannical rule with- 
in the union. It was only after the complete rout of the Thomas-Addes faction 
in the l947 elections that the SWP attempted to establish a third, independent 
left-wing caucus.89 
On the other hand, the WP viewed Reuther as being the most progressive 
of the C10 union leaders as well as the conqueror over the CP in the UAW. The 
Shachtrnanites' Stalinophobia made Reuther an attractive leader who they sin- 
cerely believed was interested in promoting a militant, yet non-CP, left-wing 
politics within the union. However, as the WPIISL auto cadre became more 
deeply embedded within the Reuther Caucus, these trade unionists moved from 
being critical supporters of Reuther, still willing to attempt to build an inde- 
pendent radical movement in the UAW, to uncritical Reutherites with no inten- 
tion of constructing such a rank-and-file group. As Reuther's politics moved 
farther to the right with the jettisoning of his earlier radical ideas, the ISL auto 
trade unionists made that journey along with him. 
So what can be concluded about the role of the CP, SWP, and WP as left- 
wing parties organizing in the UAW during the 1940s? From 1939 to 1949, the 
Communists never promoted a strategy of constructing an independent left- 
wing movement within the auto union; its preferred policy was forming left- 
center coalitions within the UAW. Inherent in this strategy was the Party's 
acceptance of the constraints imposed on the trade unions by the New Deal state 
and the modem labor leaderships, although the CP did attempt to push both the 
New Deal and the trade union leaders to the left. With the commencement of 
the Cold War, the implementation of the Taft-Hartley Act, Reuther's along with 
the other C10 union leaders' attacks on the Communists, and without the pres- 
ence of an independent base of support, the CP had virtually no chance of sur- 
viving within the trade unions. 
In contrast to the CP's subordination of worker militancy to the achieve- 
ment of an allied victory during World War 11, both the SWP's and the WP's 
auto trade unionists made a real contribution to the development of a militant 
and progressive autonomous left wing within the UAW. Although they adopt- 
ed different strategies, both the Cannonites and Shachtmanites hoped that such 
activity would continue to thrive in the postwar era, especially after the gener- 
ally successful GM strike of 1945- 1946. 
In the immediate postwar period, the SWP auto cadre maneuvered among 
the two major caucuses in an attempt to carve out such an opposition to Reuther 
nationally, and attempted to establish such groups in UAW locals where they 
retained significant influence such as Chevrolet Local 659 in Flint. At this time, 
the blocs and the alliances that they established in this era around immediate 
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issues within the union were based on a principled politics, while their objec- 
tive remained the cultivating of an autonomous left wing for the purpose of 
establishing an opposition movement within the UAW. In addition, because the 
Cannonites never succumbed to a virulent Stalinophobia and were unwilling to 
go along with Reuther's purge of the CP and its supporters, they did not capit- 
ulate to the Reuther bureaucracy and were able to retain a more critical orien- 
tation and vision in building such a movement within the UAW. In the final 
analysis, the Cannonites strongly resisted the waves of historical change crash- 
ing on the trade union left. 
This was not the case, however, for the WPIISL auto unionists who, after 
World War 11, consumed by a venomous Stalinophobia, were attracted to an ini- 
tially militant, yet increasingly anti-Communist Reuther. As the auto union 
leader tightened his control and pushed the union farther to the right, the 
WPIISL auto cadre came to see Reuther as the best that the US trade union 
movement could offer in hopes of retaining what they believed to be a left- 
wing, militant, and democratic regime within the UAW. By 1949, with the CP 
and its sympathizers purged from the auto union, the Shachtmanites held that 
the most progressive elements within the UAW were found in the Reuther 
Caucus. Thus, the WPIISL auto unionists abandoned the organizing of an 
autonomous left-wing opposition within the union, believing that it would be 
fruitless to oppose the dominant Reuther faction. 
Although following a different course, the Cannonites, nonetheless, can be 
criticized for not pursuing a more aggressive strategy in building an independ- 
ent radical opposition to the UAW's two major caucuses in 1946- 1947. When 
the SWP auto unionists did organize such a caucus in 1948, because the union's 
political climate had substantially shifted to the right with Reuther's consolida- 
tion of power, it was too late. 
Nevertheless, the WPIISL's Stalinophobia and support of Reuther's purge 
of the CP and its supporters, ultimately led to the Shachtmanites' capitulation 
before the Reuther bureaucracy believing that this was the best and only "real- 
istic" possibility at the time. And as the ISL auto union activists became com- 
pletely embedded in the Reuther Caucus, many of them abandoned the 
Shachtmanites for UAW staff positions. This became evident for Michael 
Harrington, an organizer for the Shachtmanite Young Socialist League, who ran 
into many former WP/ISL members while visiting Detroit in the mid-1950s. 
Quipped Harrington, "By that point there was a joke going around the UAW 
staff that the best way to become a union bureaucrat was to join the 
Shachtmanites. Reuther made a point of coopting his opposition as fast as he 
possibly could, so with a couple of articles to your credit in Labor Action you 
were a likely candidate to be appointed to UAW Unfortunately, the 
Shachtmanites' (and ex-Shactmanites') program and actions encouraged the 
increasing ossification and bureaucratization of the UAW throughout the 1950s. 
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